Extreme Nominalism and Humpty Dumpty
In his article on "Universals", Anthony Woozley writes:
In its extreme form, that there is nothing common to a class of particulars called by the same name other than that they are called by the same name, nominalism is so clearly untenable that it may be doubted whether anybody has actually tried to hold it. 1
There is a erude version of this position that is indeed clearly untenable. Let's foeus on predieates. On this eonstrual, extreme nominalism is the view that a predieate, as meant by a speaker, is applieable to an objeet just in ease the speaker feels inclined to apply the predicate to the objeet. Thus, aeeording to this view, the predieate "cylindrical", as I mean it now, would be applicable to my penjust in ease I now feel inclined to apply the predicate to it. The untenability of this view is hardly controversial. Not only can predieates be applicable to objects that the speaker has never eonsidered. Also, it seems to be an essential component of the notion of predicate applieability that a speaker's most earnest applieations of most predieates can be mistaken. A predieate, as meant by a speaker, can be applieable to an objeet to whieh the speaker feels inclined not to apply it. And, viee versa, a predieate ean fail to be applieable to an object to which the speaker feels inclined to apply it. Ifthe extreme nominal ist position is construed along these lines, then Woozley is probably right when he surmises that "[p ]erhaps the only extreme nominal ist has been Humpty Dumpty".2
But another view would also seem to deserve the label of extreme nominalism. The traditional debate on universals can be naturally construed as concerning the question of what notions need to be presupposed by a satisfactory ac count of the notion of predicate reference, or predicate applicability. Thus, for the realist, objective ~niversals of some kind need to be presupposed for this task. For the conceptualist, only mental universals need to be invoked. F or the resemblance theorist, we can make do with a notion of objective resemblance. Extreme nominalism can be understood as a view on this matter. F or the extreme nominalist, none ofthese notions needs to be presupposed by an account ofpredicate applicability. Predicate applicability can be explained solely in terms of the notion of speakers' feeling inclined to apply predicates to some particulars and not to others, or more generally, of their feeling inclined to c1assify particulars along certain lines. Not everyone has found this view clearly untenable. Indeed, it may have had some advocates on this side of the looking-glass.
c.I. Lewis may have been one of them. On a natural reading of
Mind and the Warld-Order, the work puts forward just this brand of nominalism. On Lewis's account, whether "cylindrical", as I mean it, is applicable to my pen depends on wh ether the pen has a certain objective property. But these objective universals are not among the primitive elements ofLewis's system. Objective properties are to be construed in terms of certain subjective items -ofwhat he calls qualia.
Notice that his advocacy of a phenomenalist reduction doesn't by itself make Lewis an extreme nominal ist. It is his specific account ofwhat qualia are that grants the ascription ofthe view to hirn. Some phenomenalists construed qualia as features ofthe subject's perceptual input, whose presence in a particular perceptual episode is independent of the subject's verdicts on the matter.
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